Chairman of the Council of Salahuddin province, Ahmed Karim confirmed what came in the Human Rights Watch report issued this week about the deportation of the families of elements of ISIS from the province was accurate, pointing out that such action has been approved by all the authorities and security forces in the province.
He added in a statement to "Arabs Today" that a number of families were expelled from Sharqat in the province of Salahuddin and housed in special camps away from their home areas, after several security breaches have occurred in Sharqat, and was later found through investigation and follow-up that those families helped terrorists by hiding in their homes, and communicate with them and provide them with information about reality in the province.
He continued: that some members of these families and put IED to one of the officers in the province and helped a number of suicide bombers, and therefore operational command expelled and decided to take them out of the province to the camps, he said, adding if we could send them to Mars, we did it.
Karim denied what came in Human Rights Watch report about the displacement of people who do not have a relationship with the organization, stressing the safety of the actions taken by the provincial council.
Human Rights Watch asserted that armed militias belonging to the popular mobilization forcibly displaced at least 125 families in the Iraqi province of Salahuddin, claiming the existence of relations between them and members of ISIS.
Security screening for those leaving ISIS-controlled areas continues to pose challenges both to civilians and to security forces. Iraqi and Kurdish security officials stressed the need to protect the population by identifying ISIS members amongst the civilian population through robust screening. 
Intelligence agencies—such as Iraqi National Security Service (NSS) and the Kurdish Assayish—are officially responsible for screening at various locations around Iraq including at IDP camps. But Hashd al-Sha’abi forces (Popular Mobilization Units or PMUs)— formed in 2014 to combat the Islamic State—are manning checkpoints and engaging in the screening of civilians, even though they are not mandated, nor trained, to do so. Arbitrary detention and disappearances have been reported at screening sites and at IDP camps such as Debaga and Zelkein under control of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and Jeddah in Qayyarah under GoI control.
As civilians begin leaving western Mosul towards IDP camps in Hamam al-Alil and Qayyara, many will encounter six to eight checkpoints run by Hashd forces between these two areas.
Families described the screening process at these sites. Men and boys, aged 15 and above, are separated from women and other children and taken to a separate tent. Names are checked against various official and informal lists of names of ISIS members. Tribes also send a “blacklist” of alleged ISIS members to Kurdish and Iraqi officials. In addition to the lists, information given by IDPs 
is also used.49 But much remains unclear on how these formal and informal lists are compiled. 
How is the information on these lists being corroborated? How is an individual’s alleged ties to ISIS actually determined, and which authority or security agency has the final word? UNAMI has sent Iraqi and Kurdish officials guidelines on screenings, but it’s unclear if there is widespread implementation
A local unit of the Popular Mobilization Forces was formed in the city of al-Shirqat by recruiting volunteers from liberated area in the aim of ensuring territorial control and administration in coordination with the Salaheddin Operations Command. After subjecting internally displaced 
persons to security vetting, the Salaheddin Operations Command detained people who are or suspected to be family members related to ISIS fighters for the following reasons: 
1- Social reasons related to the safety of these families and ensuring that they are not susceptible to acts of vengeance. 
2- Security reasons; remnants of the defeated group are infiltrating civilians and using them as human shields and targets for their suicide operations. 
3- Military reasons, to ensure that there are no infiltrators among these families that are leaking information about the positions or intended operations of Iraqi Army divisions. 
[Such leaks] might endanger civilian lives and obstruct the liberation operations.
We confirm that the force mandated with protecting the camp is the Salaheddin Operations Command and that al-Hashd al-Asha’iri (Tribal Mobilization Forces) and Popular Mobilization Forces have no role in that. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not had the chance to know 
more details about the number of families in the mentioned camp. We reiterate that our ministry has received a request to answer these questions without having enough time to respond. 
We hope that the remarks [by the Iraqi government] in regards to these questions are taken into consideration. We also hope that this would be an example of encouraging coordination between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and your organization. 
In a related issue, the government of Iraq and its investigative and judicial institutions are working hard to bring before judicial authorities whoever is found, as a result of investigations, to have committed an abuse in order to be fairly sanctioned. We have many such examples; cases of people who were found to be implicated were referred to the judiciary and they are now serving time in Iraqi prisons.