Once again, about a Syrian Taif…

Exactly forty days ago, we published a column entitled “When will Taif be a likely solution for the Syrian crisis? ‏”. [The Taif agreement, also known as the National Reconciliation Accord, was signed in 1989 to end the civil war in Lebanon.] We spoke about the equally difficult choices to make for the regime and opposition since the international community is reluctant to intervene. On that day, we asserted that the conditions for a second Taif are not yet set due to the lack of regional and international consensus or common understanding. Such consensus is a condition for the agreement of conflicting sides especially after the conflict over Syria took on an international dimension. Yesterday I listened to Professor Nassif. Even the Arab League ambassador speaks in the same context and identifies two sorts of “Taifs”: a regional/international one and a Syrian one. He too, saw that the conditions for the two Taifs have not matured yet; he explained a very shrewd proposition in political science. The proposition maintains that common interest in not always or alone the reason for building understandings and agreement between countries. Sometimes these countries base their agreements on common fears. There are no common interests for regional and international players in Syria. The conflict and contradiction of interests was standing before the outbreak of the Syrian crisis. And it continues now. And it may remain so in the near future. But the only development in the pas forty days, since we talked about a Syrian Taif is that the level of common fears has grown, aggravated and come to form an objective basis for a likely “region-international Taif” around Syria. I think it is possible to think of the Benghazi incidents and the death of the US ambassador and his companions as a decisive turning point on the way to building an international understanding based on the rule of common fears”, in the absence of “common interest” and the inapplicability of the Gorbachev theory of the “balance of interests”. It is no secret to anyone that Washington is currently making an accurate review and evaluation of its relations to political Islam in general and Arab political Islam in particular. Undoubtedly, the results of this review will range between two extremes: the maximum will be a radical change of view, approach and relation, and the minimum will be some adjustment to these. We have seen a number of indications of this review with the accusations against the Muslim Brotherhood of “fine tuning” the approach to Muslims by adopting double standards, describing their rule in Egypt as not an ally nor an enemy. They also called for the reconsideration of additional aides and canceling the meeting between Obama and Morsi. All of which was done overtly. Behind closed doors, Washington - as its allies speculate on its potential intervention in Syria after the presidential elections in November – seems far away from any imminent intervention. Washington has also become keen on turning Syria into a war against al-Qaeda and jihadists. Ankara sources mention American pressure on Turkey to face al-Qaeda and jihadists in Syria, who use Turkish territories to pass to the new jihad front as an American condition or “demand” to support Ankara in its war on the Kurdistan Workers Party. In the absence of decisiveness; the regime’s decisive victory over the opposition, the opposition’s decisive toppling of the regime, the prolonged Syrian crisis, and the growing role of Islamists in general and jihadists in particular in Syria, the chances of building an international understanding over Syria based on aggravating common fears has risen more than any other time before. This, nonetheless, doesn’t necessarily mean that regional players have become closer to consensus and understanding. Saudi Arabia and Qatar for example do not sense the same fears that started to influence the American and European stances as they proceed in supporting political Islam – composed of two wings: the Brotherhood and the Jihadist. Turkey has added a ‘personal’, party-related, and sectarian aspect to its approach to the Syrian crisis that would limit their flexibility to the developments of the constantly-dynamic Syrian crisis. The sides of the anticipated international understanding will need to exert major efforts to extract the regional understanding and bring it into effect. When it comes to “common fears”, Syria, Iran and China are making moves toward a “middle way” with the regional-international axis supporting Syrian opposition and calling for the toppling of the regime. At this point we can remember Russia’s stance which was open to ‘solutions’ that exclude Assad or end in his departure from rule. In this regard, we cannot undermine the Iranian enthusiasm to Morsi’s initiative of the regional quartet despite the “radical” stances expressed by the Brotherhood president of Egypt against Assad and his regime. So far, all initiatives and efforts aimed at solving the Syrian issue crashed with the contradicting stances concerning the fate of Assad. Should he stay or leave? When will he leave? Now, there’s a chance and probably for the first time to build international understanding for a start, and the regional understanding to come later. This would follow an equation maintaining that political transformation ends with Assad’s departure and doesn’t start with it. There are conditions and requirements for political transformation that, in my opinion, should not hinder the understandings and consensus. The date of the next Syrian presidential elections in 2014 may be a likely date to continue the process of “political transformation” and a date for new parliamentary and presidential elections in Syria where Assad would not be a candidate. The condition to this is a preceding cessation of violence and killing, the release of detainees and the formation of an interim unity government, in addition to many other trust-building steps. Note that we did not mention the Syrian internal “national understanding”. We intentionally dropped this issue at the stage of analysis. This is because after 18 months after the outbreak of the Syrian issue, some local sides lost the ability to control the path that the crisis takes. They lost their independence of decision and became more like tools and fuel to the regional and international conflict over Syria. In these circumstances, reaching the regional and international “understandings” will be sufficient. With a little efforts and pressures, the national understanding can come. --- The views expressed by the author do not necessarily represent or reflect the editorial policy of Arabstoday.