Open Door To Confrontation

President Assad's meeting with the Arab League's delegation headed by Qatar’s PM and foreign minister was 'long, positive, and friendly.' 'It discussed various aspects of the crisis in depth.' 'We agreed on a number of issues, and we are still discussing others.' 'Syria has managed to contain the Arab initiative.' 'Agreement has been reached on a diagnosis of the crisis, and subsequent discussions will address ways out of it.' 'Success in restoring the climate of trust.' 'Smiles on frowning faces.' And so on and so forth, with other titles and headlines that are not entirely free of positive indications. But despite this, the door remains open to the possibility of collapse and the signals of confrontation. The regime in Damascus is not satisfied with the Arab League. In fact, its spokespersons, especially among the Lebanese, have not ceased 'demonizing' this institution and criticizing the Arab order, describing it as 'the bridgehead for international intervention.' The Syrian opposition is also not satisfied with the Arab League's performance. Serious charges have been made against the defeatist, colluding, impotent, and paralyzed Arab order. The regime wants the League to be act as a dam in the face of international intervention. And the opposition wants the League to be a bridge towards 'protecting civilians' and in the direction of international intervention if necessary. Between the two, the League seems utterly lost. The period allowed for this round is not long. The next meeting will be held this Sunday (October 30th) – a few days from now during which another hundred Syrian lives may be lost, to join the two hundred who have fallen since the League first adopted its 'timeframe tactic.' It appears that we are now witnessing the last ditch attempt: Either a solution is reached by accord, or a slide towards the worst of scenarios and nightmares. The moment of decision is approaching with great speed. Meanwhile, Turkey and France give the appearance of having dusted their hands of the regime, and are accompanying it to its final resting place. Without Arab cover paving the way for international cover, and at least until further notice, the opposition will not be strong enough to decide the battle of toppling the regime in its favor. And even if it does, the price will doubtless be enormous. This is why the opposition appears to be in dire need of the Arab League to provide such cover. And without Arab cover, the regime will find its back exposed to the arrows of foreign intervention. This is why, for it, the Arab mediation seems like detestable food it must consume. At any rate, the battle in and over Syria appears to be focused on almost a single question: Will there be international intervention or not? If so, when, at what level, and by which means? The above is accompanied by two signs: First, the U.S. administration's repeated emphasis that its ambassador in Damascus will resume his normal activities before the end of next month. He has already bought his Thanksgiving turkey and will return to Damascus in a month's time – further signs that Washington has still not made a final decision. The second sign can be described as 'funeral diplomacy.' [Syrian Vice-President] Farouq ash-Shara' went to Riyadh to take part in the funeral of the late Saudi crown prince – which has as much to do with 'politics' as with 'human gestures' and 'courtesies.' For our part, we have no idea how it will be possible to find a compromise between the demands of the domestic and external opposition on the one hand, and the regime's ability to respond to these demands on the other. The gap is vast and is filled with a cascade of blood. It is getting as dangerous as the gap between two blades of a scissor: The further the two sides move away from each other, the more dangerous the situation. So far, it does not seem that the regime in Damascus has announced, or is near to announcing, its official and unqualified acceptance of the Arab initiative. The regime has displayed no ability or flexibility in dealing politically with the various initiatives proposed for solving the crisis, including that of the Arab League. In fact, it has displayed no inclination towards dealing with the crisis politically. The regime seems to have no option outside the framework of military and security actions. This is what can be gleaned from all the signals, positions, and statements it has made throughout the past eight months. So far, it does not seem to have any tools or means for dealing with the street's anger and protests that deviate from the official Libyan lexicon and its discourse of ‘dar dar, zinga zinga, [‘we shall hound down the opposition, house by house, alleyway by alleyway’]. And there is nothing to indicate that it will face a fate different to that of the Libyan regime. But let us not jump the gun. Tomorrow is around the corner. We will see if the regime's promises will be upheld. In fact, we shall see if the regime has made any substantial promises so far. We shall see if it can pave a political path alongside, or instead of its security/military path. As for the opposition, which is scattered between various currents, it is being polarized by a number of positions and schools. There are those who make the withdrawal of the Syrian army and an end to violence a precondition for dialogue and accepting the Arab initiative. And there are those who see no slogan other than that of 'toppling the regime.' And then there are those who want a dialogue, but under one banner alone: The transfer of power to the post-Assad regime. And this is not to say anything of the various opposition groups and their various shades inside Syria itself. We do not know how this impasse will end. The regime could have spared itself and others. President Assad should have wrapped himself historical glory. He could have struck with the sharp sword of democracy when such swords were rare and rarely left their sheaths. But he did not do so. "We now lean towards the view that 'had there been any likelihood of rain, there would have been clouds in the sky.' There are no clouds in Damascus' skies so far. Its regime is likely to die of thirst,