The war in Mali and the Algerian policy washout

Mali's crisis is set to head for more escalation and complication, especially as the war has gone beyond Mali's borders to reach every part of the Sahara and Sahel region. Currently we are witnessing only the early stage of the war in Mali. Nevertheless, the war has already turned into a regional omen, as Algeria has been forced to be engaged in it through the most unexpected way for the Algerian officials; Taking foreign and national hostages by terrorists in an Algerian gas field. It is remarkable that this is the first big hostage-taking incident ever to take place in an Algerian oil or gas-rich area, although the Algerian army has been busy throughout the nineties fighting terrorist groups. However, those terrorists have never targeted the country's oil and gas fields throughout this war. So what has changed in 2013, or in other words what is the lesson to be learnt from the incident that saw some terrorists taking Algerian and foreign hostages in a gas field located in In Amenas? Putting aside the Algerian authorities' rashness in launching a military operation aimed at releasing the hostages with no consideration to the painful outcome they have eventually received, the next question to come into everybody's mind is how the Algerian authorities have managed to play down the probability of seeing the terrorist activities expand across the Algerian borders as instantly as the French operation in Mali takes off? How could a country which has such a remarkable experience in suffering from terrorism not expect these terrorists to target the Algerian territories - particularly the oil and gas fields - especially considering the loose state of security in Libya and the entire region? It looks like the Algerian authorities have failed to expect the repercussions of the French military campaign in Mali. Although the Algerians have repeatedly called to rule out the military solution in settling the Malian crisis, yet when the French campaign came into effect, Algeria allowed the French air forces to fly through the Algerian airspace. Algeria probably played down the ability of the terrorists who are taking over North Mali to respond effectively to the French campaign, although the Algerians were aware that some of their diplomats were still in those terrorists' hostage since April 2012, when the Islamists took over North Mali's Gao and stormed the Algerian consulate in the city. The In Amenas incident showed first that there is an essential need for a comprehensive security strategy in the Sahara and Sahel region, which extends from Mauritania in the west to the South Sudanese Red Sea shores in the east. The developments in Mali cannot be seen as isolated from al-Qaeda's spread in the whole region. Thanks only to the washout that distinguishes its foreign policy, Algeria could see itself as a regional superpower which doesn't need to seek a regional collaboration in its war against terrorism. Thanks to this washout, Algeria had always insisted on its right to launch a fierce war against terrorism taking place within its territories, while the Algerians acted completely the opposite regarding terrorism taking place in the neighbouring countries. According to the Algerian theory, every terrorist deserves to be killed as long as he is found in Algeria, otherwise, his work should be praised, particularly if he is working on destroying the stability of any of Algeria's neighbours, precisely Morocco. 2013 is seeing radical changes in the regional circumstances; the old Libya is gone, and this country has turned into a free arena for the terrorist groups who are having a lot of fun there. The same may also apply for Tunisia, which suffers from a lack of control from the central authority plus a critical social situation which is set for further deterioration. Moreover, Mali which used to share a close relation with the Algerians has turned to be a direct threat against them. Whilst there is no indication that the central authority in Mauritania is going to restore its old power. This prospect has actually received a strong blow after the ambiguous incident in which President Mohammed Ould Abdelaziz was targeted. Since this incident, neither Abdelaziz nor his regime seem to be in a safe position. It is enough to remember how Algeria used to appoint high profile diplomats in Bamako, who had previously served as ambassadors in Tehran, Beirut, Riyadh and London, to know how important Mali was for the Algerians; particularly the Tuareg tribes who represent an integral part of the country's population. Regardless of whether the French campaign will succeed in uprooting terrorism in Mali, Algeria will still be in need to reconsider its foreign policy. This policy was based mainly on keeping Morocco away from any serious participation in the war against terrorism, in addition to exploiting the so-called "the Sahara cause" to blackmail the Moroccans. What happened in the Algerian gas field is a turning point and an indication that the entire region has changed. What was acceptable in the past is no more acceptable now. Are the Algerians ready to follow the change and to get over the delusions of the past? Simply they have to admit that the war against terrorism needs full cooperation between all the countries of the region, and it is beyond explanation that a country fights terrorism in its territories while it completely ignores it out of its borders. This Syrian regime-like policy belongs to an expired age. An age that everybody must know it would never be repeated under any circumstances.    The views expressed by the author do not necessarily represent or reflect the editorial policy of Arabstoday.